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Abstract
 This paper reflects on regional security issues in West Africa and especially in 
Burkina Faso, focusing in particular on international cooperation among local 
governments and border issues. When considering the recent political history of 
West African countries, such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria, 
domestic political disputes or conflicts tend to become the primary international-
ized and regionalized issues across national borders. West Africa is recognized as 
a region where people have collectively moved and exchanged throughout history. 
Conflicts that occurred in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali in the twenty-first century direct-
ly affected the security and economic situations in neighboring countries. In 
Burkina Faso, facing a huge, popular insurgency, President Blaise Compaoré 
suddenly and unexpectedly stepped down after 27 years of his authoritarian re-
gime. This unforeseen political turnover in addition to the destabilization of 
northern Mali alarmed the international community about the regional security in 
West Africa. In addition, Boko Haram has not only attacked cities and abducted 
people in Nigeria but also extended its aggressions across national borders into the 
territories of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The borders between sovereign states 
may not necessarily be barriers for extremist groups but occasionally convenient, 
permeable shields. On the contrary, for the national armies of African states, these 
borders remain strict and impermeable walls. 
 This paper also focuses on the decentralization process in Africa. 
Decentralization is one of the most crucial political and administrative reforms 
that African countries have implemented since democratization started at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. Thus, the paper examines international cooperation and the 
politics of local governments of countries that are located on the borderlands, to 
better understand regional security and border issues in Africa. We cannot provide 
an efficient measure to resolve problems and conflicts related to borders and 
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security without understanding the situation and the role of the local actors in the 
borderlands. However, it appears that the frameworks of border and security 
management have yet to sufficiently tackle this question. 
 First, the paper addresses border issues in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso is a 
landlocked country that is located in the heart of West Africa. It borders Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo, and has suffered from border-related 
problems with these neighboring countries. Border problems immediately trans-
late to serious economic difficulties and security concerns for Burkina Faso. 
Second, the paper tries to decode security issues in West Africa while considering 
case studies in Burkina Faso to examine questions about borders and local govern-
ments’ cooperation and relations with neighboring countries.
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Like in Europe, peripheral - border regions are usually neglected and border 
populations’ potential is not capitalized on, neither in socio-cultural nor eco-
nomic terms. Cross-border cooperation aims at solving those problems of border 
populations including those of minorities. (West African Borders and 
Integration [WABI] 2007a, 30)
 
1. Introduction
 The aim of this paper is to reflect on the border issues in Africa while studying 
about international cooperation among local governments and issues relating to 
regional security by examining case studies in West African countries, principally 
focusing on Burkina Faso. According to recent political history in West African 
countries, a domestic political dispute or conflict is likely to become a regionalized 
concern across national borders. 
 West Africa is known as the region where people have collectively moved and 
exchanged through long-distance trade and the immigration of peoples, such as 
Mandingo and Hausa merchants, Fulani people, and military troops, who have 
long enjoyed water transportation via the Niger River, dating back to the time of 
the ancient great empires.
 Conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali in the twenty-first century have severely 
affected neighboring countries in terms of the economy, politics, and security. In 
Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré was forced to step down unexpectedly in 
2014, after 27 years of authoritarian rule, because of the huge, popular insurgency 
against his trial of constitutional change for his third presidential term1. This 
1. Compaoré changed the Constitution for the first time in 1997 to remove the limitation on the 
presidential term. However, this constitutional modification was met with huge protests and the 
assassination of Norbert Zongo. Zongo was a widely famous journalist who had investigated an 
arbitrary murder caused by François Compaoré, the president’s younger brother. Compaoré had 
to accept the reinsertion of the presidential term limitation into the constitution (Article 37) in 
2004. Article 37 limits the president to two terms (five years in each term), for a total of ten years. 
After this constitutional change, the presidential election was held under the new Constitution in 
2005. Compaoré was re-elected. Compaoré tried again to remove Article 37 to eternalize his power 
before the end of his second term in 2015. Under such tense situations, in October 2014, National 
Assembly members tried to force the adoption of a proposition to organize a constitutional change. 
The seats in the National Assembly were massively dominated by the members of Compaoré’s 
party (Congrès pour la démocratie et le progress or CDP). On October 30, 2014, the day of the 
National Assembly vote, a massive protest took place against the constitutional violation. 
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators joined in the protests in Ouagadougou and other big 
cities. Demonstrators started attacking and setting fire to state institutions, such as the National 
TV broadcaster’s office and houses of members of parliament and dignitaries of the Compaoré 
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created a serious political vacuum in terms of regional security in West Africa. This 
unforeseen political turnover of Burkina Faso was a cause of great concern for the 
international community in terms of the regional security in West Africa, especially 
considering the volatile situation in northern Mali.
 Unfortunately, this concern materialized in attacks on hotels and cafés by an 
armed group in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital city, in January 2016. This 
terror attack was orchestrated by a group affiliated with Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Jeune Afrique 2016a, 2016b; BBC 2016; RFI Afrique 
2016; Kindo 2016)2. The group is similar to other armed jihadist groups, which are 
generally based in northern Mali and easily cross the borders of the Sahelian 
countries. This group crossed the border from Mali to Burkina Faso to carry out 
this terror attack. In addition, Boko Haram has not only attacked cities and ab-
ducted people in northern Nigeria but also crossed national borders to expand its 
aggression into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Thus, Boko Haram is no longer a do-
mestic security problem for Nigeria; it has become a regional and continental 
concern.
 Robert Kaplan (2012) mentions the following:
Whereas borders indicate passport controls and fixed divisions of sovereignty, 
frontiers indicate a pre-modern world of vaguer, more informal, overlapping 
divisions. The Great Middle East is moving away from a world of borders and 
toward one of frontiers… Again, this is increasingly a geographer’s world, 
where state borders erode and vaguer frontiers become more relevant. (352–3)
 The border between two sovereign states is not necessarily a barrier for 
extremist groups; rather, it is occasionally a convenient, permeable membrane be-
hind which they can defend themselves. On the contrary, the border is impenetrable 
for the “national” armies of African states without international coordination.
regime, including the National Assembly building itself. Despite interventions from security 
forces, these demonstrations could not be stopped. President Compaoré announced that he was 
abandoning the constitutional modification and announced his retirement at the end of his final 
term at the end of 2015. His speech was broadcast from a private TV station because the national 
TV station had been occupied by demonstrators. However, this speech failed to appease the 
demonstrators; instead, it made them accelerate their actions. Demonstrators began demanding 
President Compaoré’s immediate resignation (Iwata 2016, 147–8).
2. After Mali (November 2015) and Burkina Faso, Grand-Bassam, a touristic town located 40 
km from Abidjan, was attacked by the AQIM in March 2016.
———————————————————
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 In addition to border and security issues, this paper focuses on decentraliza-
tion. Decentralization has been one of the most formidable challenges in terms of 
governance in African countries since the democratization process started in the 
1990s. Therefore, there is a need to examine the international cooperation and 
politics of local governments in the borderlands since these state began tackling 
democratization, in order to understand regional security and border issues. We 
cannot expect to find an efficient solution to problems and conflicts related to bor-
ders without considering the role of local actors inhabiting the borderlands, because 
the life and interests of the local people are closely intertwined with questions re-
garding borders and security. However, the existing frameworks for border and 
security management might be insufficient for addressing this question. It is 
meaningful to focus on the local actors because the borders have changed in char-
acter become vaguer in terms of their orientation.
Figure 1: Borders of Burkina Faso
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
 Burkina Faso is located in the center of West Africa and has a border spanning 
3,611 km that it shares with Benin (386 km of border), Côte d’Ivoire (545 km), 
Ghana (602 km), Mali (1,325 km), Niger (622 km), and Togo (131 km). It has faced 
border disputes with these neighboring countries because of the ambiguous admin-
istrative borders drawn by the French colonial authority. Like other landlocked 
countries, Burkina Faso faces serious difficulties in terms of its economy and 
security.
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Figure 2:  Satirical cartoon criticizing the political intervention by 
President Compaoré
Source: Journal du Jeudi, No. 959, February 4–10, 2010.
 However, the political leadership of Burkina Faso has not only suffered from 
border issues but also profited from them. During the regime of President Blaise 
Compaoré (1987–2014), he profited from the geographical location of Burkina Faso 
because of the political instability of other West African countries. For instance, the 
Compaoré Administration made profits from civil wars or conflicts in Sierra Leone 
and Côte d’Ivoire while covertly supporting the illegal diamond and arms trades 
(BBC 2000; African Arguments 2012) while acting as the intermediary of peace 
talks in West Africa. 
 This paper is an attempt to decode the security issues in West Africa by exam-
ining questions about borders and the cross-border cooperation of local governments 
through case studies in Burkina Faso and neighboring countries.
 
2. Rethinking borders and security in Africa
 
2-1. Contemporary history
 Since independence, national borders have been a serious national security 
concern for African countries. These are colonial borders that the sovereign states 
retained, and despite the claim that these borders were delimited or imposed by 
European colonizers, African countries have not been able to draw more authentic 
borders.
 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) stipulated the principle of respect for 
existing borders in 1964, and its charter advocates respect for the sovereignty and 
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territory of African countries (Touval 1972, 42, 86). This principle of maintaining 
the status quo of national borders was succeeded to the African Union (AU), 
founded in 2002. Thus, African states have adopted this principle in attempting to 
deal with domestic and international disputes caused by border-related problems. 
Many African countries have suffered from conflicts with rebel groups fighting for 
separatist movements, such as Katanga (DR Congo), Cabinda (Angola), and 
Casamance (Senegal), or reunification movements for divided compatriots, such as 
the Great Somali movement (spreading over Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya) and Ewe unification movement (Ghana and Togo). Eritrea (in 1993) and 
South Sudan (in 2011) achieved independence after long and painful struggles. 
These two cases are the only cases of independence that separated existing African 
countries and creating new borders.
 African states have recognized that a modification of state borders might open 
Pandora’s box and destabilize each African state (Touval 1972, 83). In the early 
1960s, the issue of the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia divided African 
countries into two blocs: the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group. The OAU 
called on the African countries to respect the given borders that the newly born 
African countries had inherited from the former European colonizers. After the 
results of the January 2011 referendum, South Sudan achieved independence in 
July 2011. This newest case of independence was welcomed by the international 
community. 
 In general, armed conflicts have begun inside an African country and then oc-
casionally crossed borders into neighboring countries. Despite severe border dis-
putes, there have been few cases of war breaking out between national armies, 
because African armies have tended to intervene in internal affairs, rather than 
fight foreign armies. Therefore, the wars that took place between Burkina Faso 
(Upper Volta)3 and Mali in 1974 and 1985 owing to border disputes do not necessar-
ily evince the general character of armed conflicts in the history of postcolonial 
Africa.
 Colonial borders were accepted as international and official borders among the 
African states upon independence. While the border issue might be “old,” it has 
been repeatedly renewed for young African states. Borders have not only brought 
about territorial disputes but also political concern about struggles for survival 
during conflicts that have created massive numbers of refugees. Even in con-
flict-free (but not necessarily peaceful) times, the issues relating to borders are 
3. Upper Volta (Haute-Volta) changed its name to Burkina Faso in 1984 under the revolution-
ary regime led by Captain Thomas Sankara.
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always very sensitive ones of anti-government rebel forces’ activities, smuggling in 
the borderlands, and regional integration.
 Borders certainly existed among African states in the precolonial era. 
Throughout Africa’s long history, many kingdoms and chieftaincies were estab-
lished and perished. However, the governing bodies at that time did not necessarily 
delimit strict geographical borders. Traditionally, the rule in peripheral regions 
was more geographically vague. Even during the colonial period, massive move-
ments of people and ethnic groups crossed the colonial borders repeatedly to escape 
despotic rule (Herbst 2000, 88).
 The delimitation of colonial borders can be divided into two categories. The 
first category comprises the borders that were demarcated by an agreement among 
European countries. These were the international borders between European colo-
nies. The second category consists of the borders drawn inside the colonies (Touval 
1972, 4)—that is, the domestic borders. The colonial borders have not only divided 
ethnic groups and living areas but also have created new identities and aroused 
new interests in African people (Nugent 2002, 273).
 On the one hand, globalization is recognized as a basic feature in the contem-
porary world. People, capital, and information have been crossing national borders 
on a large scale and instantly. On the other hand, borders have not faded under 
globalization; they continue to exert a huge influence over people’s lives, especially 
in borderlands. Borders continue to create outsiders beyond their limits, and not 
only in a geographical sense. The borders have influenced and edified identities of 
communities and individuals and have constituted a base of political conflict. These 
aspects are displayed in the formation process of sovereign states. However, 
European countries drew artificial borders through few consultations with African 
authorities and African people.
 
2-2. Borders and security in Burkina Faso and neighboring countries
 The final border beacon (la borne in French) of delimitation between Burkina 
Faso (Upper Volta until 1984) and Mali was eventually established in 2010. The 
inauguration ceremony commemorating the peaceful resolution of the border dis-
pute was attended by representatives of both countries. After long and painstaking 
negotiations between Burkina Faso and Mali, with the support of the OAU (trans-
formed into the African Union [AU] in 2002) and Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and accepting the judgment of the International Court 
of Justice ([ICJ] 1986), the two countries finally concluded their border agreement. 
Thus, the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali was finally resolved 50 
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years after their independence (Jeune Afrique 2015a; RFI Afrique 2015; Jan 2015; 
Le monde 2015; ICJ 2013)4.
Figure 3: Resolution of the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali
Source: Le Pays (Burkina Faso), February 12, 2010.
 During the first war between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1974, the name of a 
young soldier, future President Thomas Sankara, was diffused among the people of 
Upper Volta because he had bravely fought in Malian territory. This war brought 
Sankara much admiration from the Voltaic (Burkinabe) people. During this war, 
4. In 2015, Burkina Faso and Niger accepted the proposition of the ICJ to modify their shared 
border and consequently resolve a dispute over 18 villages. 
———————————————————
Figure 4: Leaders of Burkina Faso
Source: Sankaranet website
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Sankara met his comrade Blaise Compaoré, President from 1987 to 2014. This war 
gave young officers an opportunity to join in a political game and finally establish 
the revolutionary regime (1983–87) in Burkina Faso by a military coup d’état led 
by Sankara and Compaoré. The meeting of young comrades continues to influence 
Burkinabe politics.
 Although Upper Volta retained its colonial borders, like other African coun-
tries, its border-related situation was more complicated because it was established 
as a colonial administrative unit (Circonscription administrative) under Afrique 
occidentale française (French West Africa [AOF]) in 1919, then abolished once in 
1932, but finally reestablished in 19475. Upon the re-establishment of this colonial 
unit, some parts of the colonial administrative borders inside the AOF remained 
vague until independence. Upper Volta’s border was buffeted by the shift of French 
colonial rule. This capricious re-establishment of the administrative unit in the 
French colony brought about more complicated and controversial border issues 
between Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and neighboring countries after 
independence.
 
3. Local government cooperation in the decentralization process
 
3-1. Local governance in the era of globalization
 Decentralization began in the mid-1990s in African countries, and it is appro-
priate to reconsider this process, as it has exposed its malfunction over the last two 
decades. Decentralization is the process of financial, human, and technical devolu-
tion from the central government to local governments to empower the latter. 
Although numerous studies have been done on decentralization in Africa, they 
have principally focused on administrative reform while neglecting political dyna-
mism. Decentralization is the process of redefining the roles and responsibilities of 
the central and local governments. Therefore, decentralization is essentially politi-
cal reform (Saito 2008, 284).
 At the dawn of the decentralization process, Western donor countries expected 
that decentralization would lead to an improvement in local governance in African 
countries. However, the expectations for decentralization seemed to be inflated as 
a panacea-like reform without sufficient reflection on the historical, social, and 
5. The colony of Upper Volta was divided into three parts and absorbed into the three French 
West African colonies of Côte d’Ivoire, French Soudan (currently Mali), and Niger from 1932 to 
1947.
———————————————————
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political realities in each country. In addition, the international community naively 
expected that decentralization would promote democratization at the local level 
and spread to national politics. These discourses seem to have been based more on 
ideological ideas than on the real experiences on the ground. 
 Decentralization certainly increased resources and affected the power balance 
in the local politics (Iwata 2011). A few researchers have focused on the impact of 
decentralization on elections in Africa. One reason for this is that few African 
countries have repeatedly held local elections since the decentralization reform 
was initiated. Due to the lack of financial, human, and technical resources in the 
central government of a developing country, the local governments may not have 
expected the sufficient devolution of these resources. After local elections were held 
to complete the decentralization process, the newly elected representatives in the 
local governments faced demands for local development from the residents. 
Therefore, the local governments needed to establish direct and close relationships 
with foreign local governments in order to supplement the above-mentioned re-
sources. Consequently, decentralization stimulated the international activities of 
local governments in Africa.
 In addition, quite a few studies on decentralization in Africa have examined 
the security issue. The framework of the international cooperation of local govern-
ments, called coopération décentralisée, between France and French-speaking 
African countries, has been thoroughly promoted by the French government 
working with French local governments and other European donor countries, such 
as Germany and Italy6. Coopération décentralisée is the cooperative work of local 
governments with a foreign/domestic local partner to realize common interests 
(French Foreign Ministry 2007). Therefore, many local governments in Africa have 
concluded cooperation agreements with non-African local governments as well as 
those of neighboring African countries. As decentralization progressed, the 
cross-border local cooperation became more meaningful in terms of regional securi-
6. France is the aggressive promoter of local government cooperation in Africa (principally in 
francophone Africa). Local government cooperation is not only a cooperation tool but also a “value” 
for European countries that is based on their experience of reconciliation after World War II. 
Local government cooperation was launched between French and German local governments to 
establish a multilateral network of two nations for sustainable peace. Furthermore, local govern-
ment cooperation was developed through the integration process of the European Union. Local 
government cooperation is literally the cooperation among local governments and is not limited to 
cultural exchange with the sister-city framework. Local government cooperation was stimulated 
and expanded through the decentralization process that enabled local governments to conduct 
more direct and international cooperation with foreign local governments in pursuit of fulfilling 
local interests.
———————————————————
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ty and the socioeconomic development of borderlands. 
 
3-2. Burkina Faso and neighboring countries
 Burkina Faso is a strategically important country for France to promote the 
local government cooperation policy in Africa as well as regional security. France 
has appreciated Burkina Faso as a model of decentralization7 and local government 
cooperation8. As the satirical neologism “Françafrique”9 suggests, Africa has always 
been an indispensable resource for France to maintain its diplomatic status within 
the international community as a globally influential actor. 
 The Association of Municipalities of Burkina Faso (Association des municipal-
ités du Burkina Faso [AMBF]) was founded as the main body to promote local 
government cooperation activities in Burkina Faso. It has been principally sup-
ported by France and Canada (more specifically, the Government of Quebec). The 
main French coordinator of the local government cooperation is Cités unies France 
(CUF). The Burkinabe government established the special institution, Maison de 
coopération décentralisée (MCD) in 2003, which would later be absorbed into 
AMBF.
 The second international meeting of Franco-Burkinabe coopération décentral-
isée was held in Ouagadougou in December 2007 with 1,500 participants from 
Burkina Faso (including 359 mayors), France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Niger, 
Senegal, Mali, and Burundi. The event comprised two general meetings, three 
sections, and nine group discussions over the course of two days. The local govern-
ment triangular cooperation among Burkinabe-French-German local govern-
ments10 was proposed by the German government.
7. Since the decentralization process started in 1995, 359 local units (49 urban, 302 rural, 8 
particular arrondissements in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso), known as communes, and 13 
regions were established in Burkina Faso. A commune is a basic unit of local administration 
equivalent to a city or town. The arrondissement is an administrative unit as the ward in the 
commune of special status and allowed similar status to a commune. Burkina Faso inherited the 
French system of local governance, like other French-speaking countries. The law related to local 
government (Code general des collectivités territoriales, 2004) stipulated the devolution from 
central to local government. The first full-scale local elections in Burkina Faso took place in 2006.
8. The history of local government cooperation in Burkina Faso started with the sister-city 
agreement between Ouagadougou and Loudun (France) in 1967. In the local government cooper-
ation framework, more than 120 agreements of local government cooperation were concluded be-
tween the French and Burkinabe local governments until 2007.
9. “Françafrique” is the satirical neologism expressing complex feelings that are critical of the 
close and corrupt relationship between France and the former French colonies established 
through very personal connections among the leaders and elites. See Verschave François-Xavier 
(2000).
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 The border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali drove them to fight. 
Therefore, both countries recognized the importance of international local coopera-
tion. The political instability in Mali after the coup d’état of 2012 certainly affected 
the political situation of Burkina Faso. The terrorist attack that occurred in 
January 2016 in Ouagadougou offers the most significant case of border security 
issues between the two countries, because these armed forces entered Burkinabe 
territory via Mali, thereby crossing the border to carry out this attack. Political 
instability allows the expansion of the activities of such jihadist groups. Before this 
serious incident, Samoroguan, a town located in the western region of Burkina 
Faso and 30 km from the border with Mali, had been attacked by an armed group 
in October 2015 (Jeune Afrique 2015b). The Burkinabe government had to ac-
knowledge the importance of border security in its relations with Mali to maintain 
its sovereignty and national security.
 Similar to Burkina Faso, Mali is a landlocked country, surrounded by 7,243 
km of land borders with seven neighboring countries. Due to the Ivorian crisis that 
occurred in the 2000s, Mali temporarily lost its free access to the port of Abidjan11, 
10. The trial of triangular cooperation was launched by Burkinabe, French, and German local 
governments. Burkina Faso is the pilot model country in terms of multilateral local partnerships 
in Africa. Subsequently, German, Italian, and Swiss local governments began working on a trian-
gle framework.
11. As the Ivorian crisis intensified, Mali had to seek an alternative supply route, which was 
longer and costlier, such as from/to Dakar, Conakry, even Lome or Cotonou, passing Burkina 
Faso. During my fieldwork in Benin in 2006, I watched many Malian trucks and tank lorries 
travel. Mali had to pay additional costs for its economic activities.
———————————————————
Figure 5: Session on local government triangular cooperation
Source:  The National Congress of Local Governments in Burkina Faso (Journée de la commune 
burkinabé) organized by AMBF (December 4, 2007, Ouagadougou), photographed by the 
author.
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one of the most important ports in West Africa, where 70% of goods are transported 
from/to Mali.
Figure 6: SKBo area
Source: Dahou et al. (2007, 16)
 The northern territory had been practically the area outside the efficient con-
trol of the Malian central government even before AQIM and other jihadist forces 
expanded their influence in the Sahel region. Therefore, Mali needs a good neighbor 
policy to handle this emergency situation. Mali has stressed local government coop-
eration among the local governments of the borderland. The cooperation between 
Mopti (Mali)–Ouahigouya (Burkina) and Sikasso (Mali)–Korhogo (Côte d’Ivoire)–
Bobo Dioulasso (Burkina), called SKBo, is an important example of the cross-border 
local government cooperation for Mali.
Figure 7: International meeting for local government cooperation in Mali
Source: Photographed by the author (December 2008, Bamako)
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 The Association of Municipalities of Mali (Association des municipalités du 
Mali [AMM]) is the main organizer of local government cooperation. The author 
attended the meeting for local government cooperation held in Bamako in 
December 2008, organized by AMM under the supervision of then President Amani 
Toumani Touré. Mali was the second largest base of local government cooperation 
for France after Burkina Faso.
 
3-3. Interests of France in local government cooperation in Africa
 France has been keen to sustain its influence on its former African colonies, 
covering a wide range of interests including cultural, economic, educational, mili-
tary, and political aspects. In addition, Burkina Faso is located at the center of 
French-speaking West Africa. When the terrorist attack occurred in Ouagadougou 
in January 2016, French troops were immediately dispatched to intervene against 
the armed group and to control the situation in cooperation with Burkinabe and 
U.S. troops (Jeune Afrique 2016c). France’s stake in the decentralization and local 
government cooperation in Africa is not only related to socioeconomic activities; it 
is also important for international strategy and security. The following is the 
French government’s definition of local government cooperation (Coopération 
décentralisée). The National Committee of the Local Government Cooperation 
(Comité nationale de la Coopération décentralisée [CNCD]) was set up in the 
French foreign ministry (Ministères des affaires étrangères et européennes; L. 1112-
6, Article 134, 1992):
Coopération décentralisée is the ensemble of actions for international coopera-
tion with an agreement in the objectives of common interest between French and 
foreign local governments. Coopération décentralisée takes place in diverse 
forms such as sister-city, development program, and technical exchange. 
Coopération décentralisée is speculated in the largest framework of local gov-
ernment’s foreign action by the circular of Prime Minister, announced on May 
26, 198312.
 Local government cooperation is not only for the sake of local development but 
also a strategic tool for diversifying French diplomacy in Africa. The French 
12. Le ministre de l’intérieur, Le ministre des affaires étrangères à Mesdames et Messieurs les 
préfets Mesdames et Messieurs les chefs de poste diplomatiques et consulaires, La coopération 
décentralisée des collectivités territoriales françaises et de leurs groupements avec des collectivités 
territoriales étrangères et leurs groupements, 20 avril 2001.
———————————————————
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government needs to involve more French citizens in the development assistance in 
Africa and to increase the support for the French government’s African policy. 
Local government cooperation is secondary diplomacy13 for the French government 
to maintain its influence in Africa, which allows France to keep its status as an 
influential actor in the international community. 
Figure 8:  Strategic framework for International Cooperation in French 
government
Source: Coopération décentralisée et développement urbain (2007, 56)
 Figure 8 above depicts the scheme of the French local government cooperation. 
It is a mixed cooperation between states (Etat) and local governments (Collectivités 
locales). Cités unies France is the coordinator organization for the local government 
cooperation between the French and foreign local governments (Foreign Ministry 
of France 2012a)14. The French Foreign Ministry provides financial support to the 
13. France and Germany initiated local government cooperation after the end of World War II 
to avoid another tragic war. Both countries were confident that local government cooperation 
would establish strong friendships between the two nations and assure a diversified communica-
tion channel that would keep the peace. This local government cooperation has developed for 
Europe not only in terms of friendships but also in terms of achieving the national and regional 
security goals.
14. In total, 3,800 French local governments have participated in the local government cooper-
ation, representing 8,000 projects.
———————————————————
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French local governments cooperating with the local governments in Africa. In to-
tal, the French Foreign Ministry funds 50% of the total amount for a project under-
taken by a French local government (Foreign Ministry of France 2012b). This is 
called “co-finance” (co-financement) 
 
4. Border issues and regional security in local government cooperation
 
4-1. Decentralization and cross-border cooperation
 This part focuses on local involvement in socioeconomic development and secu-
rity issues in the borderlands. 
In Africa, a country’s sovereignty stops at the border. That means: sovereign 
rights of two States meet at the border, but no State has the power to act across 
the border. Therefore, cross-border structures are needed, ideally at the region-
al/local level acting as drivers of co-operation. (WABI 2007a, 31)
 Border control and regional security can be carried out only through interna-
tional and regional cooperation among neighboring states. There are residents liv-
ing on both sides of the border, who frequently cross the border to undertake their 
daily activities. The cross-border cooperation is not only expected to establish and 
develop the socioeconomic relations in the neighboring communities but also to 
ensure national and regional security. After African countries began implementing 
the decentralization reform, the local governments were expected to play a key role 
in the economic development and improvement of life of the local residents through 
the devolution process from the central government to the local governments 
(OECD-SWAC 2010, 27). Thus, the African local governments eagerly sought for-
eign partners. International cooperation between local governments was stimu-
lated, therefore, in the decentralization process. It has been indispensable for ad-
vancing international cooperation among local governments in the borderlands, 
especially with neighboring communities across their borders, in order to carry out 
economic development and strengthen the security of the borderlands.
 People living in a borderland are linked socioeconomically and culturally 
(OECD-SWAC 2010, 8). The concept of a cross-border region was proposed by 
Malian President Alpha Oumar Konare in 2002, and cross-border cooperation has 
expanded throughout West Africa. Consequently, local governments have conclud-
ed sister-city and other agreements15. Civil society associations encourage that the 
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local people resolve conflict through a mediation process. Some other functions of 
these agreements are that health centers coordinate the use of their resources, 
schools accept young students living on the other side of their border, livestock 
breeders employ transhumance corridors, and traders have established border 
markets (FIAO Report 2005, 7).
 At the workshop on border cooperation held in Ouagadougou in July 2003, 
WABI (or Frontières et intégrations en Afrique de l'Ouest in French) was estab-
lished. WABI was supported by the National Division of Borders of Mali (a state 
organization), ENDA-Diapol (an NGO), and OECD-SWAC (an international orga-
nization)16 for funding (FIAO Report 2005, 2).
 
4-2. Cross-border local cooperation
 The SKBo region is recognized as the most hopeful and attractive case of 
cross-border triangular cooperation in West Africa. Each country in this triad has 
peripheral areas (Dahou et al 2007, 15) including the cities of Sikasso (Mali), 
Korhogo (Côte d’Ivoire), and Bobo Dioulasso (Burkina Faso). SKBo contains 3.5 
million inhabitants and covers an area of 115,000 km². 
The common history of this border area has been built through the great king-
doms of the past (Kong, Kénédougou, and Gwiriko) and the colonial period. The 
kingdom had Kénédougou as capital Sikasso and includes most of the SKBo 
between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (Yatta 2011, 2)
 The intertwining historical, geographical, and commercial aspects of this bor-
der region make it a dynamic area (Dahou 2007, 16). The SKBo region has been a 
15. Organizations for local cooperation work together, such as the Mali Association of 
Municipalities (AMM), the Burkina Faso Association of Municipalities (AMBF), the Municipal 
Development Partnership (PDM), the International Association of Francophone Mayors (AIMF), 
Cités unies France (CUF), the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), and the Cross-
border Operational Mission (MOT) (OECD Sahel and West Africa Club 2010, 19).
16. According to OECD-SWAC (2010), “The decentralisation process is an ongoing one which is 
subject to supervision on the part of support programmes with the backing of the technical and 
financial partners. The aim is that the territorial authorities should become more capable of exer-
cising their responsibilities. Authorities in border areas are faced with special challenges in 
meeting the needs of their populations: identifying a common vision for the development of a 
particular cross-border area; and the development of consistent and co-ordinated policies on both 
sides of the border (in fields such as culture, education, health, transport, economic development 
and land-use planning), as well as of services, infrastructure and cross-border public amenities (to 
avoid any duplication). In this respect, the cross-border issue has to be part and parcel of the de-
centralisation process” (9-10).
———————————————————
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space of close political, economic, and religious ties, creating a hub of trade, infor-
mation, and finance (Dahou 2007, 40). This area is at the heart of the production of 
cotton, cereals, fruits, vegetables, and animal husbandry. The port of Abidjan in 
Côte d'Ivoire includes indispensable infrastructure for the economies of Burkina 
Faso and Mali because they are landlocked countries (PDM 2006, 8; Yatta 2011, 1).
 The crisis that occurred in Côte d’Ivoire at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century severely damaged the socioeconomic activities in the SKBo region. The 
port of Abidjan was largely inaccessible to inland countries for almost five years. 
Before the civil war broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002, more than 60% 
of imports and exports from/to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, transited through 
Abidjan, representing about 7% of the total traffic handled by the Abidjan port. The 
Ivorian crisis drastically reduced the activities of the port of Abidjan by 43.4% 
(Panapress 2003). Burkina Faso and Mali had to shift from Abidjan to other big 
ports, such as Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Dakar (Senegal), Lomé (Togo), 
Nouakchott (Mauritania), Takoradi, and Tema (Ghana) to sustain their economies. 
Due to the Ivorian crisis, many immigrants came into the SKBo area (Dahou 2007, 
27). Therefore, the Ivorian crisis shed light on the importance of borderland regions 
(Dahou 2007, 15).
 This crisis divided Côte d’Ivoire into the North and the South (the main part of 
the Ivorian economy). This division not only seriously damaged the economy in 
Côte d’Ivoire but also the economies of the inland countries depending considerably 
on transport via the port of Abidjan, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. During 
the Ivorian crisis, the northern region was practically ruled by the rebel group (at 
that time), La force nouvelle, led by Guillaume Soro, the current president of the 
National Assembly, under a militarized structure. In the northern area, the borders 
with neighboring countries became more important owing to this area’s economic 
isolation from the South.
 However, the civil war ironically stimulated regional trade from/to northern 
Côte d’Ivoire often across the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali from/to Benin, 
Ghana, Guinea, Togo, and Nigeria in order to sustain the economic activities. A 
network of Malinke Muslims contributed to the socioeconomic activities in the iso-
lated northern territory of Côte d’Ivoire. The Ivorian crisis made the SKBo region 
a newly activated economic zone fostering cultural solidarity in terms of the cre-
ation of a regional network. While the separation from the southern region and 
economic capital of Abidjan was maintained, the northern region became an epi-
center of illegal trade, exporting agricultural (e.g. cocoa, cashew, cotton) and mining 
products (e.g. diamond) through the ports of Lome and Accra via Burkina Faso and 
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Mali (Nassa 2008, 9–10).
 During the Ivoirian crisis, people were reminded of the importance of solidarity 
in the SKBo region. The Kurumba (“stepladder” in Bambara) network of radio 
stations was created in the SKBo region. It comprised five community radio sta-
tions including Radio Munyu in Banfora, Kénédougou in Sikasso, Yeelen and 
Folona in Kadiolo, and Danaya in Zegoua (WABI 2006, 31). This involved the 
communities in the SKBo area in direct exchange and communication. Further, the 
youth in the borderlands (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire) undertook 
cross-border cooperation activities (WABI 2007b, 25).
 Apart from the SKBo area, Burkina Faso has other potential triangle border 
areas. For example, IIRSahel, shared with Niger and Mali, has been expected to 
promote cross-border cooperation, and the Liptako-Gourma region has broadened 
the borderlands between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, covering an area of 
370,000 km². The IIRSahel project is a program supporting agricultural develop-
ment (UNCDF 2012, 13).
 In particular, the borderlands in the northern regions neighboring Mali have 
increased the crucial meaning of security for Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso fought 
wars with Mali twice, in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, its relations with Mali 
have been Burkina Faso’s biggest security concern since its independence. In recent 
years, Burkina Faso has faced security threats from the rebel groups that have 
repeatedly attempted to cross the border from the Malian territory while Mali has 
been suffering from the political vacuum and instability resulting from the coup 
d’état that occurred in 2012. In terms of this security concern, cross-border local 
cooperation is more important for Burkina Faso. Therefore, it has been actively 
involved in local cooperation and especially cross-border local cooperation.
 There is an example of significant cross-border local cooperation between the 
local governments of Mopti (Mali) and Ouahigouya (Burkina Faso). The Dogon and 
Mossi communities were close neighbors throughout long pre-colonial history. In 
addition, this region was ruled by the same administrative unit of French Soudan 
(currently Mali) from 1932 to 1947. Therefore, this area has kept close and strong 
ties. In the local government cooperation (or la coopération décentralisée) frame-
work, these two local governments have been keen to develop diverse cooperation 
through sister-city framework and sectors such as health, agriculture, livestock, 
and security (FIAO Report 2005, 12).
 In 2004, the ECOWAS Cross-border Initiatives Programme (CIP) was initiated 
to resolve border disputes among West African countries. While border areas show 
potential for development, these areas are fertile grounds for conflicts, insecurity, 
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drug and human trafficking, and arms sales. The movement of people and the trade 
of all kinds of products take place on both sides of the border. Therefore, cross-bor-
der cooperation is quite important for promoting socioeconomic activities in the 
borderlands while successfully avoiding problems. However, political instability 
makes it difficult to maintain cross-border cooperation. The Malian political crisis 
after the coup d’état made the cross-border cooperation in Mali increasingly diffi-
cult, as many sites became inaccessible due to attacks and occupations by rebel 
forces (UNCDF 2012, 10).
 Between Benin and Niger, there are historically established ties between the 
borderland cities of Malanville (Benin) and Gaya (Niger), located on either side of 
the Niger River. These two cities have constructed a community on the basis of 
shared languages and traditions. However, under French colonialism, the Niger 
River became a demarcation between the colonial administrative unit of Dahomey 
(currently Benin) and Niger under the French colonial structure (AOF). The com-
munity on the Nigerien side was called Gaya and that on the Beninese side was 
called Malanville, derived from the name of a French military general. The 
cross-border cooperation framework has great expectations for this historically 
fostered borderland (WABI 2004, 27).
 The market of Malanville has been growing, attracting new populations and 
creating new jobs, owing to the price advantage it offers as compared to the border-
ing countries. Malanville benefits from its strategic location between the coastal 
and the Sahelian countries. This is the gate from/to the Sahel region that benefits 
from transportation via the Niger River. This area also shares a border with 
Nigeria. Thus, the Malanville–Gaya cross-border dynamism might provide great 
potential on the Nigerian side. This network is expected to involve the Nigerian 
city of Kamba especially with respect to the development of the grain market 
(WABI 2004, 28–9, 31).
 
5. Conclusion
 This paper reflected on the border and regional security issues of Burkina Faso 
and its neighboring West African countries from the perspective of cross-border 
local cooperation. In the historical context, the issue of borders has been a serious 
national and regional security concern for African countries since their indepen-
dence. African countries have faced many cases of border disputes and political 
destabilization due to such border-related problems.
 However, the border-related security concerns have changed in character in 
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recent years and become increasingly complicated. It has become easier for jihadist 
and rebel groups to cross national borders and globalize their activities. In Nigeria, 
Boko Haram announced its affiliation with the Islamic State, and in other parts of 
Africa, some rebel groups are affiliated with AQIM. On the one hand, a border 
might be a convenient membrane that allows rebel groups to defend themselves; on 
the other hand, a border still represents a strong sovereign wall for the national 
armies of African countries.
 In order to promote cross-border cooperation, it is indispensable to ensure the 
active involvement of local governments and people inhabiting the borderlands. 
The decentralization process in Africa has more or less brought about the liberty of 
activities and the responsibility of governance for local leaders, although the 
devolution from the central government to the local governments is still incomplete. 
Decentralization may not only be expected to encourage cross-border cooperation 
for economic development and the improvement of the lives of local residents but 
also to promote national and regional security. Poverty might provide a good re-
cruitment opportunity for jihadist groups. In the context of the recent terror attacks 
in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, jihadist groups had reportedly recruited 
local people who perceived maltreatment on the part of the central government and 
were, thus, resentful. The residents of borderlands or marginalized areas might be 
more likely to share such resentment. In that sense, cross-border local cooperation 
is essential for developing the local people’s lives and ensuring that they are not 
tempted to join in jihadist activities. 
 However, this paper does not conclude that decentralization is a panacea-like 
measure for resolving any kinds of problems in the local communities and for pro-
moting local development, poverty reduction, cross-border cooperation, local de-
mocracy, and security in borderlands. On the contrary, we need to consider that 
decentralization might create problems and disputes in the local politics and gover-
nance. Therefore, we cannot expect too much from decentralization; rather, we 
should consider it as an important institutional option for achieving the 
above-mentioned objectives, because the central governments and Heads of State 
in African countries are likely to neglect the borderlands unless the leaders come 
from these regions or they are resource-rich regions. Therefore, we need to high-
light that decentralization is an unignorable optional measure that might contrib-
ute to the promotion of cross-border cooperation and borderland security.
 The cross-border cooperation among local governments is expected to strength-
en border security while uncovering the activities of rebel forces, illegal transactions 
or the smuggling of arms, drugs, minerals, and agricultural products, and human 
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trafficking across borders. However, African countries have always faced limita-
tions in their capacity for border control due to insufficient financial, human, and 
technical resources.
 This paper focused on Burkina Faso because this country once had a reputation 
as a model of decentralization and was the aggressive sponsor of local governments’ 
international cooperation. Indeed, the Burkinabe government played host to two 
international meetings for local cooperation (Assises de la cooperation décentral-
isée). The Malian government organized a similar international meeting in 
Bamako. Both Burkina Faso and Mali have a common interest in developing local 
cooperation in order to ensure national security as well as local development, espe-
cially through the cross-border local cooperation framework. However, political in-
stability in the two countries caused serious damage to the cross-border local coop-
eration, especially after the coup d’état in Mali in 2012 and the popular insurgency 
in Burkina Faso in 2014. 
 In Mali, the northern region has not been under the effective control of the 
central government, despite broad deployments of an international peacekeeping 
operation with France, the United States, and the United Nations after the coup 
d’état created a significant political power vacuum. In Burkina Faso, after 
President Compaoré was practically ousted by the insurgency of 2014, the councils 
of the local governments (communes), composed of elected mayors and councilors, 
were dissolved by the transitional government (Zoure 2014) to eradicate the influ-
ence of the former regime as well as the National Assembly, because the represen-
tatives of the local governments (the council of commune) were dominated by the 
Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP, Congrès pour la démocratie et le pro-
grès), the dominant party during the Compaoré regime. The transitional govern-
ment temporarily sent governors to govern local bodies until the installation of new 
local representatives after the municipal elections (held in May 2016). 
 Since the transitional government dissolved the local governments in 
November 2014, international cooperation among the local governments has been 
practically suspended in Burkina Faso without any true local leadership or initia-
tive. The cross-border local cooperation between Burkina Faso and neighboring 
countries also became inactive. Therefore, it is necessary to normalize the institu-
tion of local governance in order to restart the cross-border local cooperation.
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